Articles
OAKWOOD HEAL THCARE, INC., 348 N.L.R.B.

No.

37 (2006): How TEXTUALISM SAVED THE
SUPERVISORY EXEMPTION

Michael W. Hawkins, Esq.*
Shawn P. Burton, Esq.**
For the past twenty years, union membership has been steadily
declining.' For instance, the International Association of Machinists, or
IAM, has reported a decline of over 100,000 members from 2000 through
2003.2 Overall, less than 8% of private sector employees choose to be
represented by unions.' This dramatic decline in union membership over
the past 20 years is uniformly recognized. The AFL-CIO, in fact, recently
recognized that "union membership has declined from a high of 33% of the
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1. See The Labor Research Association Online, Job Losses Erode Union Membership
(February 23, 2004), http://www.laborresearch.org/print.php?id=347 (noting that "[t]he
unionization rate for the private sector has fallen by about half over the past twenty years").
2. See IAM's LM-2 Report from 2004, http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do
(indicating a recent sharp decline in membership) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
3. Press Release, U.S. Department of Labor, Union Members in 2005 (January 20,
2006) available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2006).
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workforce . . . to less than 15 percent.",4 This decrease in union
membership has been accompanied by (or been the product of) a decrease
in the number of union elections, or as they are commonly known,
representation elections.' The number of union representation elections
held in 2005 decreased to 2,117 from 2,361 in 2004, continuing an annual
decline in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) elections
since 1996 when about 3,300 elections were conducted . Recent changes
in the union movement will likely curb this decline, increase organizational
activity around the country, and inevitably lead to a significant increase in
the number of representation elections.
On April 28, 2005, the President of the AFL-CIO, John J. Sweeney,
released a twenty-six page manifesto of sorts entitled "Winning for
Working Families."7 The document's design was to address the recent
failures of the labor movement as well as the membership declines
spawned by these failures. It specifically states that "[o]ur goal is clear:
We must rebuild our movement to create a stronger voice and a better
future for working people."' To meet this objective, the document broadly
outlines a strategy that will more than likely have a major impact on many
of America's employers. The strategy is to give local unions in all
industries monetary incentives to ramp-up organizing efforts. The AFLCIO alone has set aside roughly $500 million per year to "deepen and
increase the activism ...build lasting mobilization structures... [and] stay

organized not just for elections but between elections.. .. "'
Several influential members of the AFL-CIO, led by the Teamsters
and the Service Employees International Union, are unhappy with these
changes, and have therefore disaffiliated very recently from the coalition.'"
According to most sources, the split was the byproduct of a fundamental
disagreement between AFL-CIO leaders and others over the best strategy
for reinvigorating the movement, i.e., stopping the decline in union

4. John J. Sweeney, Winning for Working Families: Recommendations from the
Officers of the AFL-CIO for Uniting and Strengthening the Union Movement at 3 (April
at
2005),
available
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/outfront/upload/executive-officers.pdf.
5. See Michael H. Cimini, U.S. Department of Labor, NationalLabor Relations Board
2003),
Union
Representation Elections, 1998-2002
(April
28,
(NLRB)
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/content/cb20030425tb01.stm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006)
(indicating a decrease in the number of union representation elections).
6. Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Number of NLRB Elections, Win Rate By Labor
Unions Both Decreased in2005,DAILY LABOR REP., No. 80, C- 1 (April 26, 2006).
7. Sweeney, supra note 4.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 11.
10. See generally BNA, UNITE HERE Disaffiliatesfrom AFL-CIO, Citing Differences
Over Organizig,Politics, DAILY LABOR REP., No. 178, at AA-1 (September 15, 2005).
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membership." The AFL-CIO leaders believed that resources should be
allocated equally to lobbying for favorable legislative change and to
organizational activities. The disaffiliated unions disagreed with this
strategy, believing that resources should be allocated primarily, if not
exclusively, to union organizing efforts. 12 The disagreement prompted the
historic split, with the disaffiliated union taking a "pot full of money" that
was once allocated to paying coalition dues that can now theoretically be
The AFL-CIO reforms, coupled with the
used for organizing. 3
disaffiliated union's strategy to pour significant resources into organizing
efforts, will invariably result in more union elections. 14 The number of
elections could, in fact, increase dramatically. 5
This article explores how these changes, and in particular the increase
in union elections, place renewed importance on section 2(11) (also
referred to throughout as the "supervisory exemption") of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 16 as well as the NLRB's institutional
obligation to set out a statutorily sound interpretation of section 2(11).
The article then explores and provides an answer to the much more
Did the NLRB finally satisfy this
important and related question:
institutional obligation in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37
(2006), the Board's most recent and arguably most comprehensive
refinement of the supervisory exemption? 7 Or will Oakwood meet with
the same interpretative misfortunes of the Board's past constructions of
section 2(11)?

11. Id.
12. For instance, on February 22, 2006, the American Federation of State, County and

Municipal Employees (AFSCME) announced a new program entitled Union Spring Break
2006. The program is designed to recruit and train future union organizers. John Melegrito,
A Great Spring Break, http://www.afscme.org/publications/3573.cfm (last visited Nov. 24,
2006).
13. See generally BNA, AFL-CIO Council to Hold Special Meeting to Respond to
Defections by SEIU, Teamsters,, DAILY LABOR REP., No. 143, at AA- 1 (July 27, 2005).
14. See generally BNA, Split in AFL-CIO Said Likely to Generate Additional
Organizing Drives, Union Activism, DAILY LABOR REP., No. 144, at AA-2 (July 28, 2005)

("Observers from both labor and management circles agree the split will likely generate at
least a short-term bump in union organizing drives and union activism").
15. Id.

16. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2006).
17. The Board announced two other related decisions on the same day as Oakwood:
Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota,Inc., 348 NLRB No. 39 (2006) and Croft Metals, Inc., 348

NLRB No. 38 (2006). In both, the Board applied for first time the standards articulated in
Oakwood. The three cases, before the Board actually decided them, were collectively called
the Kentucky River cases, for reasons that will become obvious below.
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THE SUPERVISORY EXEMPTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING
IMMEDIATE INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE

Representation proceedings often precede a union election.'"
A
representation proceeding is nothing more than a hearing at which an
NLRB Hearing Officer (or sometimes an Administrative Law Judge)
decides who will and who will not vote in the election.' 9 More specifically,
when the respondent, most often an employer, in a representation election
(and sometimes in an unfair labor practice hearing) disagrees with the
composition of the voting unit designated by the petitioner, most often a
union, one of the Board's Hearing Officers will determine whether the
designated voting unit is an "appropriate" unit.2 ° This determination is
made prior to the election at what is called a Unit Clarification ("UC")
hearing.2' The Hearing Officer's determination centers on whether the
proposed voting unit contains employees who have a mutual interest in
wages, hours, and conditions of work, otherwise known as a "community
of interests. 22 In conducting the community of interests analysis, the
Hearing Officer is not searching for the single best unit. 23 Their job is only
to examine whether the proposed unit is an appropriate one.24 If the
Hearing Officer determines that the proposed unit is appropriate, the

18. This is not always true, however. Sometimes there are no disputes over who will
participate in the election. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
19. Other election matters can be addressed at this hearing, such as the date and time of
the election. See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASEHANDLING
MANUAL PART Two, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/manuals/r_casehandling__manual_(II).aspx (detailing the procedure used in representation proceedings).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2006) ("The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof ....
").
21. See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND
PROCEDURE

IN

REPRESENTATION

CASES

40,

available

at

http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline-chap4.pdf (describing the peition for Unit
Clarification).
22. Continental Baking Co., 99 NLRB 777, 782 (1952); see also NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 125,

available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline-chap4.pdf (detailing how and
why a community of interest is found).
23. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610 ("[E]mployees may seek to organize
,a unit' that is 'appropriate' -- not necessarily the single most appropriate unit."); see also
Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 87 F.3d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The Board need only select
an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit."); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES

123, available at

http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline-chapl2.pdf ("there is nothing in the statute
which requires that the unit for bargaining be ...the most appropriate unit; the Act requires
only that the unit be 'appropriate."').
24. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr, 87 F.3d at 308.
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employees identified by the petitioner will constitute the voters in the
representation election. If the Hearing Officer determines that the proposed
unit is inappropriate, the Board will include or exclude the employees
necessary to make the unit appropriate.25
The UC hearing is the first, and likely the most important procedural
event in the election campaign for both parties involved. The election
could be affected by the composition of the unit, as well as "the future
course of... labor relations."2 6 Employers and unions alike will, therefore,
vociferously battle to obtain a voting unit (and later a bargaining unit) that
will most likely yield a favorable electoral outcome. Central to these
battles will be (and has always been) the statutory supervisory exemption,
contained within Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act. 7
The supervisory exemption was created in 1947 in an attempt to
maintain a balance between unions and employers, and to avoid situations
where members of a bargaining unit might experience a conflict of interest
between representing management as a supervisor and collective action on
behalf of employees.28 According to Section 2(11) of the Act, a supervisor
is:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward or discipline other employees, or to responsibly
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.2 9
As has been made clear on multiple occasions, "[t]he text of [section]
2(11) of the Act... sets forth a three-part test for determining supervisory

25. Over the years, the Board has used a number of factors related to the community of
interests analysis to determine whether a unit is appropriate, including: evaluation of the
employees' desires, duties and skills of the designated employees, the extent of union
organization, bargaining history, whether there is common supervision amongst the
These factors are
designated employees, and the employers' organizational structure.
heavily relied upon. This is true largely because the National Labor Relations Act itself
See
provides the Board little statutory guidance for determining an appropriate unit.
generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
at
123-39,
available
CASES
REPRESENTATION

http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline-chapl2.pdf (describing the procedure by
which the appropriate unit is determined).
26. Louis Jackson and Robert Lewis, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENT'S
STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 107 (1972).

27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).
28. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980); Florida Power & Light Co.
v. IBEW Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 808-10 (1974); N.L.R.B. O.M. Mem. 04-09 (Oct. 31,
2003).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).
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status."3 ° Employees fall within this statutory exemption if (1) they hold
the authority to engage in any of the twelve listed supervisory functions, (2)
their "exercise of such authority is not of merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment,",31 and (3) their authority is
held "in the interest of the employer., 32 All three questions must be
answered affirmatively; otherwise the employee will not be deemed a
supervisor under the Act.33
The NLRA thus does not cover and, by logical extension, does not
protect supervisors.34 This means that supervisors may not be included in
the voting (and later the bargaining) unit. 35 The inclusion of a supervisor in
the proposed voting unit would make the voting unit inappropriate. This
has obvious consequences for the UC hearing described above. The
Hearing Officer must often times determine an employee's proper job
classification (i.e., supervisor or non-supervisor) in assessing the
appropriateness of the proposed voting unit.
And, as has been recognized for some time, "[t]he most frequently
litigated job classification issue is whether a particular employee is a
supervisor as defined by the Act., 3 6 The supervisory exemption has indeed
provided fertile ground for controversy because many employers in any
number of different fields have employees whose duties straddle the lines
of professional, supervisory, and managerial functions. The supervisory
exemption has, in fact, been a point of contention over the years in just
about all sectors of our economy, including communications and
40
39
38
publishing, 37 construction and mining, transportation, public utilities,

30.
31.
32.
33.

NLRB v. Kentucky River, 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).
Id.
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 574 (1994).

34.

See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND

PROCEDURE

IN

REPRESENTATION

CASES

204-15,

available

at

http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/outline-chapl7.pdf (discussing the supervisory
exception in the Act).
35. Id.
36. Jackson & Lewis, supra note 26, at 109.
37. See, e.g., Russell J. Davis, Who Are Supervisors Within The Meaning of The
National Labor Relations Act In Communication and Publishing, 48 ALR Fed. 45 (2006)
(identifying who qualifies as a supervisor in the context of communications and publishing).
38. See e.g., Russell J. Davis, Who Are Supervisors Within the Meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act In Construction and Mining Operations, 54 ALR Fed. 74 (2006)
(identifying who qualifies as a supervisor in the context of construction and mining).
39. See e.g., Russell J. Davis, Who Are Supervisors Within the Meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act In Transportation Operations, 50 ALR Fed. 126 (2006) (identifying
who qualifies as a supervisor in the context of transportation).
40. See e.g., Russell J. Davis, Who Are Supervisors Within the Meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act in Public Utilities Operations,51 ALR Fed. 14 (2006) (identifying who
qualifies as a supervisor in the context of public utilities).
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health services, and education,4' just to name a few.
The problem that has historically faced unions and employers alike is
that the Board has failed to fully articulate the parameters of the
supervisory exemption (or at least one that could withstand Supreme Court
scrutiny). Indeed, much jurisprudential uncertainty has existed. For
countless years, employers and unions have been left to guess who is and
who is not a supervisor. Worse yet, they have had to satisfy themselves
with the inherent uncertainty produced by the application of section 2(11)
without a definitive standard. This historic jurisprudential uncertainty is
the product of the Board's consistent misinterpretation and recent
inattention to the supervisory exemption, both of which border on
institutional malpractice. Indeed, ever since 2001, the year the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned the Board's second attempt to articulate
guidance on the supervisory exemption, the law in this area has been
marred with uncertainty. Employers, Unions, and the Hearing Officers
who are on the front lines applying section 2(11) on a daily basis, have had
little guidance. In an environment that is ripe for an explosion in the
number of representation elections, legal uncertainty about one of the most
hotly contested election issues was simply unacceptable. There was an
urgent need to clarify the uncertainty that surrounded the supervisory
exemption. The Board needed to act. The Kentucky River cases, as they
have been so pejoratively named, gave the Board the opportunity to do just
that. These cases gave the Board the chance to provide employers, unions,
and its own agents with much-awaited and much-needed guidance. The
Board had the opportunity to finally eliminate the uncertainty.
The question on everyone's mind in 2003 when the Board decided for
the first time that it would tackle the supervisory exemption: will the
Board finally get it right, or will it prolong the uncertainty by promulgating
yet another interpretation of the supervisory exemption that the Supreme
Court would find unacceptable. The remainder of this article explains why
the Board got it right, averting historic d~jd vu, and finally eliminating the
jurisprudential uncertainty once and for all.
II.

THE BOARD'S HISTORICAL MISINTERPRETATION AND RECENT
INTERPRETIVE INACTIVITY OF THE SUPERVISORY EXEMPTION

The Board has always struggled to adopt an interpretation of the
supervisory exemption that is statutorily sound enough to withstand
Supreme Court scrutiny. In recent years, the health care industry has been
the primary (or at least the most recognized) battle ground for supervisory
41. See e.g., Russell J. Davis, Who Are Supervisors Within the Meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act in Education and Health Services, 52 ALR Fed. 28 (2006) (identifying
who qualifies as a supervisor in the context of education and health services).
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issues and the Board's efforts to promulgate an interpretation that will not
be struck down by the high court.42 Charge nurses and their proper
statutory categorization (i.e., supervisor or not) were thrust to the forefront
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 43 For many years, the Board and courts
disagreed on whether and under what circumstances a charge nurse was a
supervisor within the meaning of 2(11). The Board used, what it termed,
the "patient care" analysis to resolve this question. Pursuant to the patient
care analysis, the Board examined whether "the alleged supervisory
conduct of the charge nurses is the exercise of professional judgment
incidental to patient care or the exercise of supervisory authority in the
interest of the employer.",44 If the judgment was incidental to patient care
(i.e., in the interest of the patient), the charge nurse would fall outside the
definition of supervisor. On the other hand, if the charge nurse exercised
judgment in the interest of the employer, he or she would fall within the
definition of supervisor.45 In other words, if the alleged supervisor is
directing another employee to do that which she was technically trained to
do, the alleged supervisor would not constitute a statutory supervisor,
regardless the type of direction.
Not surprisingly, the Board's "patient care" analysis was not widely
accepted by the circuit courts because of the apparent disconnect with its
ostensible statutory source, section 2(11). Several courts specifically
reasoned that the Board's patient care analysis carved out an exception for
charge nurses that ran contrary to the plain language of the statute.4 6 The
Sixth Circuit, for instance, held that "it is up to Congress to carve out an
exception for the health care field, including nurses, should Congress not
wish for such nurses to be considered supervisors, 4 7 reminding the Board

42. See Jonathan E. Motley, Grandmothers And Teamsters: How The NLRB's New
Approach To The Supervisory Status Of Charge Nurses Ignores The Reality Of The Nursing
Home, 73 IND L.J. 711, 711-44 (1998) (stating that NLRB's decision that charge nurses are
supervisors misunderstands the difference between acute-care hospitals and nursing homes).
43. Charge nurses are responsible for the daily functioning of their ward, or unit; they
will determine unit needs, direct nursing staff, and assess nursing care given by the staff.
See
EM
Nurses
Home
Page,
The
Charge Nurse
Role/Description,
http://depts.washington.edu/emsuw/nurses/charge.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2006)
(describing duties and requirements of charge nurse). The charge nurse must be a certified
RN in emergency medical service with six months experience as an RN. Id.
44. Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 NLRB 491, 493 (1993) (citing Newton-Wellesley
Hospital, 219 N.L.R.B. 699, 699-700 (1975)).
45. Id.
46. See Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
registered nurses came within supervisory definition); NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian
Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that licensed practitioner nurses
were supervisors).
47. Northcrest Nursing Home v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1261 (6th Cir. 1993)
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"that it is the courts, and not the Board, who bear the final responsibility for
interpreting the law."48
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and several other
circuit courts. It found that the Board's interpretation "created a false
dichotomy" and thus "makes no sense. 4 9 Specifically, the Court found
that the "patient care" analysis departed unacceptably from the plain
meaning of section 2(1 1) and rendered "portions of the statutory definition
in § 2(11) meaningless."50
The Court then spoke to the Board's
indifference to the text of section 2(11), admonishing that "the statute must
control the Board's decisions, not the other way around."5 This decision,
by no means, resolved the controversy over the proper interpretation of
"supervisor." And, of course, the Board continued to misinterpret it.
After the Northcrest decision, the Board focused on another part of the
statutory definition of supervisor: independent judgment. 2 The Board
settled on an interpretation that would, once again, prove controversial.
The Board interpreted "independent judgment" such that the definition
excluded those who exercised ordinary professional or technical judgment
in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with
employer-specified standards.53 According to this interpretation, an
employee does not exercise "independent judgment," as enumerated in
section 2(11), when they are merely exercising "ordinary professional or
technical judgment in directing less skilled employees to deliver
services. 54 In other words, independent judgment is not independent if it
arises from technical knowledge or experience.
Staunch criticism
immediately followed.
Employers argued that this interpretation
impermissibly narrowed the definition of a supervisor, pulling into the
NLRA's coverage many employees with true supervisory responsibilities
albeit under some direction from higher management. 5
The Board's interpretation came before the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Kentucky River Community Care.5 6 Like in Northcrest, the Supreme Court
48. Id. at 1160. Note that LPN stands for Licensed Practical Nurse.
49. NLRB v. Northcrest Nursing Home, 511 U.S. 571, 577 (1994).

50. Id. at 578.
51. Id.at 580.
52. E.g., N.L.R.B. O.M.Mem.04-09 (Oct.31, 2003).

53. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Kentucky River, 532 U.S. 706.

56. Id. In Kentucky River, the employer operated a home for the mentally disabled.
Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1999). The facility
employed approximately 110 professional and non-professional employees in addition to
about twelve clearly managerial or supervisory employees. Id. at 449. The Kentucky State
District Council of Carpenters ("Carpenters") petitioned the Board, requesting to represent
all 110 of Kentucky River's professional and non professional employees. Id. At the UC
hearing, the employer objected to the inclusion of six registered nurses who had the job title
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disapproved of the Board's interpretation. Also like in Northcrest, the
Court did so because the interpretation was not sufficiently wed to its
statutory roots in section 2(11). The Court specifically found that "[t]he
first five words of

.

.

. [the Board's] interpretation insert a startling

categorical exclusion into the statutory test that does not suggest its
existence."" Such a categorical exclusion, the Court further reasoned,
would virtually eliminate supervisors from the Act.58 The Court found the
remaining words of the Board's interpretation ("in directing less-skilled
employees to deliver services") were also unsupported by the text of
section 2(11): "[t]his second rule is no less striking than the first, and is
directly contrary to the text of the statute."59
Even a cursory reading of Kentucky River demonstrates that it far from
resolved the controversy surrounding section 2(11). The Court not only
left many questions unanswered, it apparently generated a few new
questions. 60 An article published right after the decision commented about
the practical impact of Kentucky River:
Far from settling the matter, the Kentucky River decision has
placed back before the Board the question of whether nurses or
any professional, technical or skilled employees who rely on less
highly trained or experienced personnel to help them accomplish
their work now fall outside the protection of the Act. Does
Kentucky River mean that any guidance or direction given by a
professional to another employee constitutes supervisory
conduct? Will working as part of a team with other employees
who do not share the same professional expertise cost the
professional his or her section 7 rights? Is a skilled electrician
who works with an apprentice or other assistant an exempt
supervisor based on directions he or she gives the assistant?
And, even more to the point, does the NLRB retain discretion to
of Building Supervisors. Id. It claimed that they were supervisors and, therefore, excluded
from the Act's coverage and from the voting unit. Id. The Board's Regional Director (who
conducted the hearing) disagreed and included the six disputed employees in the bargaining
unit. Id. After the Carpenters won the election, the employer subsequently refused to
bargain on the ground that six charge nurses were improperly included in the voting unit.
Id. The NLRB then found that the employer's refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor
practice. Id. The employer petitioned the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for review and the
Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. Id. The Sixth Circuit, holding that the
Board's interpretation of the "independent judgment" language of Section 2(11) was in error,
refused to enforce the Board's order. Id.at 454. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in an
effort to determine the proper interpretation of the "independent judgment" language in
Section 2(11). NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 708 (2001).
57. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 714.
58. Id. at 714-15.
59. Id.
60. See N.L.R.B. O.M. Mem. 04-09 (Oct. 31, 2003) (discussing the Board's invitation
for briefs on a series of supervisory issues following the decision in Kentucky River).
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construe the Act in a manner that will prevent a significant
portion of the professional workforce as well as large numbers of
nonprofessionals, but skilled and experience workers thought to
be at the very core of the category of employees protected by the
Act, from 6being swept outside the Act's protection as
supervisors? '
Obviously, this left practitioners, employers, and unions alike
searching for guidance in this turbulent area of labor law. The Supreme
Court, like it did after Northcrest,placed the onus on the Board to properly
interpret the supervisory exemption. The Board shied from the challenge
for nearly two years, however, choosing to address the supervisor issue
with already-established and accepted principles of law (discussed below),
rather than try to fill the statutory void created by Northcrest and Kentucky
River. Due mostly to the Board's interpretive inactivity, the circuit courts
likewise provided no guidance after Northcrest and Kentucky River. The
circuit courts, while occasionally referencing Kentucky River and at times
purporting to apply its principles, simply addressed the supervisor issue
using well-established legal principles.62
In an attempt to provide some much needed guidance, in July 2003,
the Board invited interested parties to file briefs addressing supervisor
issues left unresolved by Northcrest and Kentucky River, a rather unique
move. 63 The specific issues that the Board requested input on included:
1.The difference between assigning and directing.
2.The meaning of the word "responsibly" in the statutory phrase
"responsibly to direct."

61. Craig Becker & Diana 0. Ceresi, Toward A Rational Interpretation Of The Term
"Supervisor"After Kentucky River, 18 LAB. LAW. 385,386 (2003).

62. See Public Service Co. of Colorado v. NLRB, 405 F.3d 1071, 1079 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that workers were not supervisors just because they made decisions affecting
bonuses); Hosp. Gen. Menonita v. NLRB, 393 F.3d 263, 267-68 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding
determination that registered nurses, who direct the patient care tasks of LPNs and
technicians, were not supervisors); NLRB v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 334 F.3d 478,
485-86 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that "lead" employees who distribute tasks assigned by shift
supervisors to technicians were not supervisors under section 2(11)); Entergy Gulf States,
Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 211 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding operations coordinators who
direct field workers are supervisors); Coastal Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 24 Fed. Appx. 120, 121
(4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished disposition) (refusing to enforce NLRB order because of
Court's holding in Kentucky River); NLRB v. Quinnipiac Coll., 256 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001)
(stating that security officers were supervisors because they directed others, assigned tasks,
and recommended discipline). But see Multimedia KSDK, Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.3d 896,
900 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the Board's order because it contradicted with the Court's
holding in Kentucky River); Coastal Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 24 Fed. Appx. 120, 121 (4th Cir.
2001) (unpublished disposition) (refusing to enforce NLRB order because it applied the
standard that existed before the Court's holding in Kentucky River).
63. Lester A. Heltzer, Notice and Invitation to File Briefs (July 25, 2003), available at

http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/kyriver.pdf.
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3.The distinction between directing 'the manner of others'
performance of discrete tasks' and 'directing other employees,'
guidance offered by the Court in Kentucky River.
4.The significance of schedules that rotate employees in and out
of supervisory positions.
5.What is the meaning of the term 'independent judgment' as
used in Section 2(11) of the Act? In particular, what is the 'the
degree of discretion required for supervisory status,' i.e. 'what
scope of discretion qualifies.'
6.What are the appropriate guidelines for determining the status
of a person who supervises on some days and works as a nonsupervisory employee on other days?
7.To what extent, if any, may the Board interpret the statute to
take into account more recent developments in management, such
as giving rank-and-file employees greater autonomy and using
self-regulating work teams? 64
In response to this request, the Board received briefs from twenty-two
interested parties. 65 Armed with these submissions, the Board appeared
primed and ready to provide the long awaited interpretative guidance that
would affect an estimated 8 million workers.66 This guidance could not
come soon enough, as there were countless cases pending before the Board
raising these very issues.67
The remainder of this article provides the authors' thoughts on three
issues addressed by the Board in Oakwood, and specifically how the Board
articulated an interpretation of the supervisory exemption that will finally
withstand Supreme Court scrutiny. The authors' thoughts are preceded by
a brief summation of supervisory issues that have already been settled, an
64. Id.
65. Press Release, NLRB, Statement of National Labor Relations Board Regarding
at
available
2006)
13,
(July
Cases,
River"
"Kentucky
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2596.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
66. See Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Supervisor in Name Only: Union Rights of
Eight Million Workers at Stake in LaborBoard Ruling, ECON. POL'Y INST., Issue Brief #225
(July 12, 2006) ("The very broad definition of'supervisor' employers are seeking could take
away the right to join a union and bargain collectively from 8 million Americans throughout
the labor market.").
67. The NLRB consolidated three cases to specifically address these issues: Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., Case 7-RC-22141; Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., Case 18-RC-16415; and
Craft Metals, Inc., Case 15-RC=8393. However, there "are an additional 65 cases awaiting
decisions in these three cases." Michelle Ambler, Labor Movement Rallies Around Pending
NLRB Rulings Defining Supervisors, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), No. 1522-5968, at 14-11
(July 14, 2006). See also Joyce E. Cutler, NLRB: Multiple Cases on Supervisor Definition,
DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), No. 171, at C-I (September 6, 2005) (speaking about the issues
left unresolved by Kentucky River, Chairman Battista stated, "I'm hopeful we can get this
[decision] out when we return to five-member status. It's a priority. It's an important issue. It
has a substantial backlog of cases behind it. The issue is likely to go to the Supreme Court
for the third time. It's important we get it right.").
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overview of the scholarly work addressing the three, until recently,
unsettled issues, along with an explanation of how these works have missed
the mark.
III. THE SUPERVISORY EXEMPTION: ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES

There are a host of legal principles relating to the definition of
supervisor that are uncontroversial and well-settled.
Although not
exhaustive, below is a list of some of the important principles.
A."Supervisory issues are, of course, highly fact bound. Deciding
whether an individual possesses any 2(1 1) indicia of supervisory authority
often calls for making delicate, difficult, and even fine distinctions, and
there are frequently gray areas. ,,68
B.Congress sought to distinguish between truly supervisory personnel,
who are "vested with genuine management prerogatives," and employees,
such as "straw bosses, lead men, and set-up men, and other minor
supervisory employees. 6 9 Consequently, the Board and courts will,
generally look beyond titles and specified hierarchical stations to an
employee's actual authority.7 °
C.Congress' intent was to create a definition that would fairly
reconcile two competing interests: (1) providing protection to an expansive
number of employees; and (2) ensuring that employees with genuine
management authority were denied organizational rights because, in
Congress' judgment, they should have an undivided loyalty to management
interests when they exercise independent judgment with respect to
personnel matters or the responsible direction of work.7"
D."[I]n the interest of the employer," from section 2(11) covers most
employment conduct. As the Supreme Court held in Northcrest: "[a]n
employee who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to
engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities, including responsible direction of

68. Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 NLRB 491, 493 (1993).
69. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace.Co., 416 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1974) (quoting S. REP. No. 80-

105, at 4 (1947)).
70. See e.g., Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2001)
(looking to activities such as monitoring of power lines to determine whether workers are
supervisors).
71. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279-283 (holding Congress intended to exclude
from NLRA protection all employees classified as managerial); Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Elec. Workers, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 807-813 (1974) (stating Congress amended
definition of employee to exclude supervisory positions); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1178 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that engineers are not supervisors as
defined by Congress); Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 668, 671 (1978), enforced,

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1981) (asserting that Congress
could not have meant to include supervisors in the definition of employee).
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other employees, is a supervisor."
E.Although never determinative, the Board and most courts use
"secondary indicia" as a means of determining supervisor status.
Secondary indicia include: perception of other workers, attendance at
management meetings, time spent ordering others around rather than
engaging in production work, salary, distinctive clothing, and the ratio of
employees to supervisors.73
F."The burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory
exception ...fall[s] on the party asserting it," i.e., the employer.74
G.The Kentucky River decision does not undermine prior Board
decisions based on other indicia of supervisory status, i.e., authority to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward, discipline or
adjust grievances.75
H.The three-part supervisor test remains in tact. In other words, to fall
within the category of supervisor and be denied protection under the Act,
three conditions must be met: (a) employee holds the authority to engage in
or effectively to recommend any 1 of the 12 listed supervisory functions
(i.e. hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall promote, discharge, assign,
reward, discipline other employees, responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances); (b) the exercise of such authority is not merely routine or
clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment; and (c) the
authority is held in the interest of the employer.76
This is what we do know. But as touched on above, this left much
unresolved either because of historic misinterpretation or recent
interpretative inaction by the Board. Of the unresolved issues, three took
center-stage in the recently decided Oakwood case: (1) What does it mean
to "assign;" (2) What does it mean to "responsibly direct;" and (3) What
degree of independence constitutes "independent judgment." 77
The
remainder of this article will explain how the Board's interpretation of
these three formerly unresolved issues were right on the mark.

72. NLRB v. Northcrest Nursing Home, 511 U.S. 571, 579 (1994).
73. See NLRB v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 334 F.3d 478, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2003)
(looking to indicia such as time spent ordering others to state that employees were not
supervisors under section 2(11)); Entergy Gulf States, 253 F.3d at 209 (looking to time spent
managing others to say they are supervisors); N. Mont. Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d
1089, 1096 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (using indicia such as perception and not relying on "paper
authority"); NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs. Ltd., 176 F.3d 154, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999) (using
indicia such as directing others).
74. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001).
75. Becker & Ceresi, supra note 61, at386 (2003).
76. Public Service Company of Colorado v. NLRB, 405 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir.
2005) (citing Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 711-12).
77. 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *4-11 (2006).
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INTERPRETING THE SUPERVISORY EXEMPTION: TEXTUALISM

Scholars and practitioners can argue about how the remaining
unresolved issues should have been resolved by appealing to normative,
value-laden concepts like the friendly resolution of industrial disputes or
"conflicting policy goals that Congress sought to reconcile."78 However,
this would be an exercise in futility. A more useful exercise would be to
argue about how the remaining issues will likely be resolved. Why? In the
final analysis, the Supreme Court will have the last word on the Board's
interpretations.
This consideration should guide and, perhaps more
importantly, should limit any discussion about the parameters of the
supervisory exclusion. Scholars should take stock of the Court's prevailing
methodology used for purposes of statutory interpretation. This is, no
doubt, what the Board did, and actually had to do in articulating the new
standards in Oakwood. This alone ensured that the decision would not
suffer the fate of the standards examined in Northcrest and Kentucky River.
Considering the make-up of the Court, the Board needed to (and, as
will be explained below, did) employ textualism in resolving the issues
referenced above and discussed below. Textualism holds that the text of a
given piece of legislation should retain primacy. As a result, there is no
need to delve into the vagaries of congressional intent or legislative history,
both of which are elusive concepts leading to incongruent results based on
speculation and surmise.7 9
Interpreting a statute under a textualist
methodology merely requires giving "nontechnical words and phrases their
ordinary meaning."8 ° The ordinary or "plain meaning of a text is the
meaning that it would have for a "normal speaker of English" under the
circumstances in which it is used." 81 To ascertain this ordinary or plain
meaning, "[t]extualists rely primarily on dictionary definitions, rules of
82
grammar, punctuation, and canons of construction.
It is irrelevant whether one agrees with this methodological approach
to statutory interpretation because the U.S. Supreme Court will most likely
use textualism to scrutinize any of the Board's interpretive moves. Indeed,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are self-proclaimed textualists. 83
78. N.L.R.B. O.M. Mem. 04-09, supra note 58.
79. Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense
of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396-98 (1996).
80. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993).
81. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rev. 204, 206 (1980).
82. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist,and Empiricist, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747,747 (1995).
83. See Shawn Burton, Justice Scalia's Methodological Approach to JudicialDecisionMaking: Political Actor or Strategic Institutionalist? 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 575 (2003)
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Constitutional scholar William N. Eskridge, Jr. remarked on Scalia and
Thomas' approach to constitutional statutory interpretation:
Justices Scalia and Thomas operate under an approach to public
law that is philosophically positivist and doctrinally textualist.
They claim that courts are duty-bound to apply the plain meaning
of statutory and constitutional texts, and not to depart one iota
from their commands, even when to do so would appear fair and
just. s4
Some have even claimed that Justice Kennedy is a textualist.8 5 This may
also be true for new appointees to the Court. John Roberts, the new Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court is, according to many accounts, a
textualist. 6 Additionally, Samuel Alito, the Court's most recent appointee,
nicknamed "Scalito" by the mainstream media, is also rumored to be a
87
textualist.
More importantly, textualism has guided the Court in the seminal
supervisory cases. In Northcrest and Kentucky River, the Court rejected the
Board's interpretations primarily because they were not sufficiently wed to
the text of the statutory exclusion. In Kentucky River, for example, the
Court stated that "[t]he first five words of this interpretation insert a
startling categorical exclusion into the statutory text that does not suggest
its existence."88 The Court continued with its textual admonishment, noting
that "[t]he text, by focusing on the 'clerical' or 'routine' (as opposed to

(identifying Justice Scalia as a textualist); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism and Original
Understanding: Should The Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory
Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1998) (identifying Justices Scalia
and Thomas as textualists)..
84. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism and Original Understanding: Should The
Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1301, 1301 (1998).
85. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation,8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 755, 758 (1995) ("Justices Kennedy and Scalia have led a textualist
movement claiming that the plain meaning of the statute should be given effect.") (internal
quotations removed); see also Pierce, supra note 82, at 748 (identifying Justice Kennedy as
a textualist).
86. See, e.g., Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik Michael Zimmerman, Posting the Ten
Commandments is a 'Law Respecting an Establishmen of Religion'?: How McCreary
County v. ACLU Illustratesthe Need to Reexamine the Lemon Test and its Purpose Prong,
23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25, 58 (2006) ("Chief Justice Roberts [has] a commitment to a
text-based, rule-of-law approach to the Constitution."); Categorically Imperative, John
Roberts:
A
Bork
in
Sheep's
Clothing,
Aug.
22,
2005,
http://dailykos.com/story/2005/8/22/18180/3617 (last visited Oct. 11, 2006) ("John Roberts
is purportedly an originalist and a textualist.").
87. See, e.g., Emily Umbright, U.S. Supreme Court Watchers Weigh in on Alito, Miers,
ST. Louis DAILY REcORD/ST. Louis COUNTIAN, Nov. 2, 2005 ("Alito is going to be closer to
the Thomas purist type, where you start with text and you make precedent fit with text.").
88. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 714.
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:'independent') nature of the judgment, introduces the question of degree of
judgment that we have agreed falls within the reasonable discretion of the
Board to resolve. 89
Thus, appeals to normative values, efforts to discern congressional
intent, or attempts to scour over the legislative history to resolve the issues
addressed below would be unproductive, resulting in a higher likelihood of
reversal by the high Court. Using a non-textual methodology would have
been the Achilles heel for the Board, as it had been in the past. Focus
needed to be concentrated on the plain meaning of the terms being
interpreted. Textualism was the key to getting it right this time around. 90
Obviously (even though there is no candid admission) the threemember. Board majority in Oakwood recognized this methodological
reality, making clear at the outset of the decision that they would not
employ "a results-driven approach" or rely "primarily on selective excerpts
from legislative history."9'
Instead, they wisely chose a textualist
approach, explaining that "we start, as we must, with the words of the
statute." 92 A review of the decision demonstrates that the three-member
majority faithfully applied this approach to construing "responsibly to
direct," the difference between "assigning" and "directing," and
"independent judgment," enabling them to produce sound statutory
interpretations that will not suffer the fate of those examined in Northcrest
and Kentucky River.
A.

Responsibly To Direct

"Responsibly to direct" is arguably the least ambiguous of the phrases
addressed in Oakwood, particularly when viewed from a textualist
perspective. Direct is commonly defined as "to point, extend, or project in
a specified line or course." 93 Responsibly is commonly defined as "subject
to being held to account., 94 From a textualist perspective then, any
individual who instructs or guides any part of the workforce (i.e.,
employees at any level) in the operation of the business and is held
accountable for such instruction or guidance, no matter how significant the
guidance or instruction, responsibly directs.
This text-driven interpretation was adopted in Oakwood. With respect
to "direct," the three-member majority explained that "the authority to
89. Id.
90. Not only will a textualist approach help ensure that future Board interpretations do
not suffer the fate of Northcrest and Kentucky River, it will also produce an interpretation
that accommodates workplace realities in the 21 st Century.
91. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *15 (2006).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988).
94. Id.
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'responsibly to direct' is not limited to department heads." 95 Instead, as
long as the putative supervisor "has 'men under him, and ... that person
decides what job shall be undertaken next or who shall do it,' that person"
directs.96 With respect to "responsibly," the Board turned again to the
"ordinary meaning of the word." 97 As explained by the Board, "for
direction to be 'responsible,' the person directing and performing the
oversight of the employee must be accountable for the performance of the
task by the other, such that some adverse consequence may befall the one
providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the employee are not
performed properly."98
Many will, of course, disagree with this interpretation because it
admittedly sweeps many individuals from the Act's coverage, something
that would not necessarily result with a narrower and less text-sensitive
interpretation. Prior to the decision, in fact, the General Counsel, argued
for an interpretation that would require the "direction" to be much more
significant. The General Counsel proposed an evidentiary standard that
states "[a]n individual who responsibly directs with independent judgment
within the meaning of Section 2(11): has been delegated substantial
authority to ensure that a work unit achieves management's objectives and
is thus 'in charge."' 99 In a similar vein, Craig Becker and Diana Ceresi,
two union attorneys, contend that:
[T]he entire legislative history of § 2(11) suggests that § 2(11)
authority to "responsibly to direct" is an "essential[ly]
managerial" authority to direct the overall work of all employees
in a department subject to "only general orders," such as that
traditionally exercised by a foreman or department head (like the
Director of Nursing in a nursing home) over all underlings in a
department.100
Even the dissent in the Oakwood decision raised concerns about such an
interpretation, claiming that a text-driven interpretation of "responsibly to
Direct" would result in supervisory status being extended to "every person
on the shop floor."' 0'
The General Counsel's interpretation, as well as Becker and Ceresi's,
are certainly not inconsistent with the Court in Kentucky River. As Justice
Scalia said, "[p]erhaps the Board could offer a limiting interpretation of the
supervisory function of responsible direction by distinguishing employees

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.LR.B. at *27.
Id. at *28.
Id. at *32-33.
Id. at *32-33.
N.L.R.B. O.M. Mem. 04-09 (Oct. 31, 2003)
Becker & Ceresi, supra note 61, at 403.
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.LR.B. at *8.
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who direct the manner of others' performance of discrete tasks from
employees who direct other employees ....
This does not, however,
mean that the individual needs to be 'in charge' or be a department head to
be responsibly directing. The Board majority wisely refused to read too
much into Scalia's statement, because doing so would ignore the plain text
of Section 2(1 1). "Direct" is modified by "responsibly." It is not modified
by significant or substantial (or any term synonymous with significant or
substantial). Instead, the plain text reads such that any direction, as long as
there is accountability, constitutes "responsible direction." Interpreting
''responsibly to direct" in the manner suggested by the General Counsel
would add a modifier that is simply not in the statutory text. If Congress
intended the definition suggested by the General Counsel and Becker and
Ceresi, it could have added another modifier after "responsibly." Congress,
for whatever reason, chose not to. As the Court said in NLRB v. Health
Care, "it is for Congress not us, to create exceptions or qualifications at
odds with [the Act's] plain terms."'0 3 The dissent's concerns, valid or not,
ignores one critical consideration: result-driven interpretations that focus
on potential "real world" consequences have not and will not survive
Supreme Court scrutiny.
B.

The Difference Between Assigning and Directing

"Assigning" and "directing" presented a tougher interpretive task for
the Board, mainly because they are linguistically similar enough that one
could mistakenly take the position that there is no discernable difference in
meaning between the two. Again, since the text retains primacy, there must
be a distinction. Congress certainly did not intentionally include an active
verb, and at the same time intend it to be superfluous.
Such an
interpretation defies logic, especially from a textualist point of view.
Therefore, any attempt to identify a distinction must start with the plain
meaning of the two words.
4
Assign is commonly defined as "to appoint to a post or duty."'0
Juxtaposing this definition with the definition of direct, the distinction
becomes clear. As noted above, direct is commonly defined as "to point,
extend, or project in a specified line or course."'0 5 Operations are directed,
whereas employees are assigned. That is, an individual conducts, manages,
runs, steers, and controls (all synonyms for direct) a business or a discrete
portion of a business. On the other hand, an individual appoints or

102. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 720.

103. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am, 511 U.S. 571, 573 (1994).

104.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988).

105. Id.
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designates employees to a particular task within the confines of the
prearranged operations.
Obviously there will be overlap. For instance, when an individual
controls the operations, he or she may also be given the responsibility to
determine exactly how the employees will fit into the operations. Overlap
is not inevitable, however. Consider an individual (A) who designs or
engineers a manufacturing process to make product (X) and also sees to it
that the daily operations conform to that design. However, (A) is not
involved in determining which employees are stationed at which machine
or which employees perform which tasks in the process. This latter task is
left up to another individual (B), who may or may not be held accountable
to (A). Under this scenario, (A) is directing, but not assigning, and (B) is
assigning, but not necessarily directing. The distinction lies, therefore, in
the subject upon which the action is taken.
Despite the distinction, "assign" and "direct" do have something in
common. Like directing, the plain language of Section 2(11) must be read
to include any assignment. Otherwise, another modifier would be read into
the statutory text, something that is clearly at odds with the plain language.
The inclusion of other modifiers (i.e., "responsibly" and "independent
judgment"), makes the conclusion, countenanced by others, that another
non-explicit modifier be placed in front of "assign" illogical. Becker and
Ceresi, nevertheless, advocate an interpretation of "assign" that would do
just that. They specifically argue that:
[R]eading "assign" to refer to non-transitory work status changes
is consistent with the rule of statutory interpretation that words in
a list should be given similar meanings. The authorities listed in
the definition of supervisor--to "hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,"
etc.-generally encompass matters pertaining to employment
status rather than matters pertaining to performing day-to-day
operations.'16
The dissenters in Oakwood similarly argued that "an assignment is an
that must affect 'basic' terms and conditions of employment or
employee's 'overall status or situation.' 10 7 Like Becker and Ceresi,
dissent would impose "a unique
and heightened standard on
10 8
assigning."
of
function
supervisory

106. Becker & Ceresi, supra note 61, at 399.
107. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *5.
108. Id.

act
an
the
the
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This narrow interpretation would require that the assignment be
significant, such that "merely assigning tasks to employees does not make
an employee a supervisor."' °9 A narrow interpretation would obviously
provide protection to many more individuals than the relatively broad
interpretation advanced above. While this may be advantageous to union
adherents, such an interpretation, as explained by the Board majority in
Oakwood, ignores the plain text of Section 2(11). And as we have seen
before, the Court will not accept an interpretation that ignores the plain
text, regardless of whether it is arguably faithful to the "structure, and
history of the statute.""10
Recognizing this, the Board majority in Oakwood turned to the
"ordinary meaning of the term 'assign,"' refusing to adopt an non-textual
interpretation merely based on "predictions of the results it will entail."' "
In doing so, the Board recognized that, in order for its interpretation to be
textually meaningful, there had to be a discernable difference between
assign and direct." 2 Thus, as explained by the Board majority, "direction
may encompass ad hoc instructions to perform discrete tasks; assignment
does not."' 3 For the Board majority, and to the obvious dismay of the
dissent and others, the statute plainly does not contain a modifier before
"assign," and, thus, any interpretation that would require the assignment to
be one that changes the basic terms and conditions of the assigned
employee's working conditions is textually and statutorily illogical.
Consistent with the plain meaning of the term, and as explicitly recognized
by the Board, "assign" must be construed as involving any instance where
an employee is assigned to a task. This would necessarily include more
than just the act of "giving significant overall duties."'" 4 It would also
include, something the Board keenly pointed out, "the act of designating an
employee to a place (such as a location, department, or wing)" and the act
of "appointing
an employee to a time (such as a shift or overtime
15
period)."'
C.

Independent Judgment

As the Supreme Court made clear in Kentucky River, "independent
judgment" in section 2(11) deals with the degree of independence
exercised, rather than the kind of independence exercised. That much is

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Becker & Ceresi, supra note 61, at 399
Id. at 398.
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *25 (2006).
Id. at *17.
Id. at'21-22.
Id. at *"18-19.
Id.
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apparent. The Supreme Court failed, however, to draw a line between
supervisory independence and non-supervisory independence, except to
state that "the degree of judgment that might ordinarily be required to
conduct a particular task may be reduced below the statutory threshold by
detailed orders and regulations issued by the employer," and that "[i]t falls
clearly within the Board's discretion to determine, within reason, what
scope of discretion qualifies."' 16 Independent judgment is arguably the
most ambiguous of the terms discussed so far. As a result, it presumably
presented the most difficult interpretative task for the Board. However, the
plain meaning of the term resulted in a sound interpretation, or at least an
interpretation that will survive future Supreme Court scrutiny.
Independent is commonly defined as "not subject to control by
7
others.""..
From this definition, the Board could draw a relatively bright
line between supervisory independence and non-supervisory independence.
As long as an individual can make a decision without obtaining approval
from another--whether from a single individual, a committee, or some
other type of collegial body-the judgment is sufficiently independent to
be supervisory. If on the other hand, an individual must obtain prior
approval before making any decisions, the judgment is not sufficiently
independent to be supervisory. This interpretation would not only comport
with the text or plain meaning of the term, but would also be consistent
with the Court's dicta referenced above. Decisions dependent on, rather
than merely guided by, detailed orders and regulation issued by the
employer would constitute non-supervisory judgment. But where the
orders or regulations-whether they come from a Company manual or
another supervisory employee-merely provide guidance for making a
decision, and the purported decision-maker retains the ultimate discretion
to authorize the decision, the judgment would be supervisory.
Like with the two other terms in question, the Board majority, in
interpreting "independent judgment," remained faithful in Oakwood to the
text. They stated, in no uncertain terms, that "[t]o ascertain the contours of
'independent judgment,' we turn first to the ordinary meaning of the
term."'l 8 In doing so, the Board majority did, as analysis above would
suggest, define independent judgment to mean "not subject to control by
others." 119 They also made clear that independent judgment is no less
independent simply because the putative supervisor is guided by some
manual, proclaiming that "the mere existence of company policies does not
eliminate independent judgment from decision-making if the policies allow

116. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added).
117. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988).
118. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37, at *36 (2006).
119. Id. at *9
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for discretionary choices."' 120 Clearly then, the Board's interpretation is
consistent with a textualist methodology.
V.

CONCLUSION

The number of representation elections will invariably increase as
unions begin to implement their new strategy for halting the decline in
union membership. The supervisory exemption in section 2(11) will, as it
has historically, be one of the most hotly contested issues in these elections.
The Board thus had an institutional obligation to not only provide unions
and employers with statutory guidance, but also to provide statutory
guidance that would withstand Supreme Court scrutiny and not suffer the
fate of its two most recent attempts to interpret the supervisory exemption.
This article has suggested the methodological tool for meeting its
institutional obligation: textualism. Textualism will ensure that the
Board's interpretations are consistent with the plain meaning of the
statutory terms at issue. The Supreme Court has historically demanded and
will continue to demand statutorily sensitive interpretations of the
supervisory exemption.
Interpretations that are sufficiently wed to
statutory text of section 2(11), like the three articulated in this article, are a
must. Normative values and attempts to discern congressional intent are
not the ingredients of sound statutory interpretations of section 2(11), and
will do nothing but engender more uncertainty.
This article has also suggested that the Board, in Oakwood, met its
institutional obligation by applying a textualist methodology. The Board
successfully resisted (unlike the dissent and others) the temptation to
employ a non-textual methodology, which looks to things like "the context
and purpose of the National Labor Relations Act and . . . authoritative

legislative history."' 12' It recognized what it should have recognized many
years ago: "in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point
must be the language employed in Congress,

. .

. and we assume that the

legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used."' 122 This faithful application of the statute ensures that the Supreme
Court, overwhelming comprised of textualists, will sustain the
interpretations set out in Oakwood. Now, not only do unions, employers,
practitioners, and the Board's agents, have "meaningful and predictable
standards for the adjudication of future cases ...

the Board's constituents"

have the certainty that has been sorely missing since the supervisory

120. Id. at *38.
121. Id. at *21

122. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37, at * 15 (2006) (quoting Immigration
and Nationalization Serv. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)).
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exemption was added to the NLRA over fifty years ago.'23 This certainty is
of vital importance in the current union organizing climate which will
invariably make the supervisory exemption the most hotly contested issue
in all of labor law.

123. Id.

